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Von Der Muhll: Politics and the Disintegration of Civilizations

POLITICS AND THE
DISINTEGRATION OF CIVILIZATIONS

CEORCE VON DER MUHLL

Why do civilizations disintegrate? Contemporary scholars have
offered many answers. Soil exhaustion, deforestation, disease,
population overload, protectionist trade policy, technological obsolescence in the arts of war--each has been held to have fatally
eroded the foundations of the great empires of the past. 1 Toward
1470 B.C., a cataclysmic volcanic explosion not only shattered the
island of Thira but is now thought to have sent out an almost
unimaginable 165-foot wall of sea water across the open Aegean
to Crete, overwhelming the base of the ancient thalassocracy of
Minos within minutes and leaving it in legend as a dimly remembered Lost Atlantis. Volcanic eruptions many centuries later may
have contributed more directly to the poorly recorded but quite
terminal disruption of Javanese high culture. 2 Meteorologists
have shown that climatic changes between the thirteenth and
sixteenth centuries rendered Viking efforts to maintain a civilization in the far northern oceans untenable.:1 Some scientists link
the unrecognized consequences of the Romans' use of lead as an
aqueduct lining to the slow decline of their Empire; others
foresee only too clearly the instantaneous disappearance of its
Western successor (and perhaps all of civilization) in a single
thermonuclear flash. 4 Such hypotheses have by now displayed a
range and inventiveness almost as awesome as their imputed
consequences.
Until the past century, most observers attributed the disintegration of civilized order to more spiritual causes. I n perhaps the
most celebrated of these analyses, Edward Gibbon drew his study
of the "fall" of the Roman Empire to a close with the summary
declaration, "I have described the triumph of barbarism and
religion."5 Gibbon courted notoriety in his time with his provocative conjunction of causes, but he could hardly claim novelty fiJI'
the thesis itself: it merely echoed (though with radically reversed
92
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connotations) Aug-ustine of Hippo's explanation thirteen centuries earlier for the unlamented collapse of a secular order in
which he had the misfortune to live. 6
General theories of moral decay-abetted, depending on the
writer's purpose, by such agents as a wrathful God, an uncorrupted barbarian horde, or an internal proletariat-likewise
formed the theme of analog-ous Jewish, Muslim, Chinese and
Aztec chronicles. In these accounts, the fall of great civilizations
occurs as the justly deserved punishment of prideful rulers and
corrupted subjects. But while these annals did not differ greatly
in the preeminence assigned to the moral dimensions of the
drama, individual writers could and did divide over whether to
treat societal disintegration as a cyclical or a monotonic process,
and whether as temporary disequilibrations of social forces or as
inexorable manifestations of divine will. Such issues, which once
separated Plato, Machiaveli, Ibn Khaldun. and the court historians of Imperial China from more unilinear philosophers of
human history. have been carried forward unresolved into this
century in the writing-s of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. 7
This proliferation of explanations for the fall of civilizations in
itself requires little explanation. Individual social analysts, differently educated and positioned differently within their own
societies, predictably have been influenced in their interpretive
emphasis by the range and salience of the civilizations they knew,
the general level and sophistication of the scientific knowledge of
their period, and the moral lessons they sought to draw. But
explanatory pluralism has resulted from more than differences
of perspective. Undoubtedly, it reflects the complexity of social
reality itself. "Disintegration" as an empirical referent must cover
both the collapse in a matter of weeks of the Inca Empire and the
prolonged decay of Byzantium. Only retrospective insight into
divine intention can permit one to postulate a single general law
covering the conversion of the Abbasid caliphate into a Mongol
province, of Minoan Crete into a "Lost Atlantis," and of Coptic
Christian Ethiopia into a revolutionary Marxist regime. Absent
the possibility that the rhythms of world history have been controlled by fluctuations of a single variable-a position for which
there is no evidence-diversity in theorizing follows inevitably
from matching theory to historical fact.
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It seems improbable, on the other hand, that attempted explanations addressed to a common problem should perfectly cancel
one another out. But if so, then what common elements do they
contain? Evidently rather few. The similarities are mainly negative. Most notably, these accounts typically portray the disintegration of the civic cores of the ancient civilizations as a by-product of
developments outside that sphere. Unsound irrigation practices,
rigidities of social structure, pulverizing natural catastrophes,
perhaps otherworldly religious preoccupations are held to bring
changes in societal behavior that destructively spill over into the
political arena. Indirectly and without deliberate intent, these
developments set an agenda the government cannot meet. They
alternately stress the civic order and paralyze its responsive capacity, first limiting the possibilities for effective collective choice and
then undermining the will to make them.
In many cases, the connections among these forces are presented as imperfectly perceived by the society at the time, or not
perceived at all. Indeed, explanations for the disintegration ofthe
great historical civilizations seem today to gain plausibility in
direct proportion to the demonstrated improbability that their
rulers could have perceived the connections. H The guardians of
civilization, it has been argued, have been least likely to cope with
debilitating factors that fell outside the range of their explanatory
paradigms. Only by accident could they make the right adjustments to such hazards as trace contamination of the drinking
water. The decline of civilizations thereby becomes a tale of
tragedy and of terror. Its contemplation leads inexorably to reHections on the blind frailty of the human race.
Macro- Theory: Toynbee on Civilization
Among the many efforts to account for the downfall ofcivilizations, one has exercised a preeminent claim to the attention of
contemporary macro-historians by virtue of its scope and sweep,
its wealth of empirical illustrations, and the systematic form of its
presentation. Arnold Toynbee's magisterial A Study oj Historytwelve volumes in all-stands essentially by itself in these respects. 9 It represents by far the most ambitious attempt to demarcate and classify the great civilizations of the past and to arrange
the details of their emergence and decline in a manner suggesting
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submission to acommon law. It offers a unified perspective onthe
most elemental processes of the largest differentiated units in
which human societies can be grouped. It towers so prominently
among works of its kind that critics have understandably drawn
general conclusions concerning the feasibility of systematic
macro-history from an assessment of its achievements and deficiencies.
A Study o/Jlistory is in principle a study ofal! history. Toynbee
made a determined effort to break with a eurocentric perspective
within which other civilizations and proto-civilizations become
mere types-"oriental," "primitive," and the like. "Europe" appears in his pages much as it does on a globe-as an offshoot, a
derivative entity, that must compete for the eye with the Ferghana
Valley, the Indonesian archipelago, and the Mexican plateau.
Critics have inevitably uncovered the biases of a Western scholar,
but it is a great merit ofToynbee's work that it continuously keeps
the dynastic and religious wars of the West European nationstates in a context formed by civilizations remote in space and
time. This quality is reinforced by his method of continuous
comparison. For Toynbee, the major problems of history come
into view when one juxtaposes similar outcomes in civilizations
conventionally treated as too dissimilar to bear scrutiny in the
same treatise, or when anomalies emerge from an explanation of
closely related societies over entire millenia rather than in the
decades within which they appear undifferentiated. A reader of
Toybee soon becomes hahituated to the expectation that
generalizations concerning the dynamics of a civilization will be
checked against nothing less than an alTay of data drawn from a
global history of the human race.
But it is not so much for the scope of Toynbee's project that he
has become celehrated, nor yet for his comparative methods, nor
even for his extraordinary assembly of detailed knowledge.
Rather, he has become best known for his distinctive thesis concerning the determinants of the rise and fall of the civilizations he
studies. Here Toynbee shows exceptional deliberateness in the
presentation of his argument; and it is on this conceptual fulcrum
that he rests his broadest claim to have uncovered the controlling
elements in the rhythms of society.
In its general form, this thesis has become well known. Toynbee's search through the annals of the great historic civilizations
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led him to assi~n a crucial role to "challenges" and "response" in
their histories. Civili/ations, according to Toynhee, emerge when
their members confront an environment neither too severe to
leave a margin above mere survival for the development of high
culture (e.K., the Arctic wastelands of the Eskimo), nor too llIlstimulating to produce that culture (the South Pacific islands).
These environmental boundaries establish the necessary conclitions for the growth of civili/ations; responses within the lone of
intermediate challenges provide the sufficient conditions. But
responses sufficient to produce a major civilizatioll do not suffIce
to slIstain it. As in (~reek tragedy (of which Toynbce was a dose
student), civilizations carry the seed of their own destruction: in
time they develop lopsidedly, take on an exaggerated cast,
rigidify, become ritualized. and ultimately cease to lind responses
appropriate to the altering challenges. Event ually, new forccs---in
Toynbee's dralTlatur~y, an "external" and all "internal"
proletariat-surface; the former characteristically presents a decisive new environmental challenge, the latkr fatalh weakens the
capacity·--and the resolve-to respond. All civilizations (including, Toynbee fears, the Western, for which he thinks the apogee
may have been reached in the 17th century) appear to f()lIow this
ineluctable progression.
Toynbee repeatedly presses beyond conventional historical description in his search for ex planations for the growt h and decline
of civilizations. llis twelve volumes ofler a wealth of tellingly
selected data to support his script. Tovnhee claims to find substantiation for his thesis in the precise climatoiogicil features of
Chile and Ceylon. lo He writes with assurance about t he intricacies
of Byzantine theology and Ottoman administrative codes. Whatever the failings of his treatise, they do not derive flom excessive
abstraction. Yet only ruely does detail appear to Ilt' piled UpOll
detail for its own sake. A Sludy ojl-lislory is an impressive example
of historical writin~ in which narration is continuously used to
develop or check a theory.
Toynbee's work is striking, too, f()r its slistained w;e of t he same
small set of variables to ~ive order to the enonnously variegated
historical tapestry he places on display. His organi/ing concept s
economically focus on the elemental systemic properties common
to the complexly integrated cultural patterns he treats as civilizations. The pressures of ecological and social environments; the
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possibilities I()r, and appropriateness of, the responses-these
themes al'e traced throughout human history to the remotest
frontiers ofhuman habitation in deliberately repetitive fonn, and
they continue to generate the same large questions and to suggest
the same basic answers concerning why human energies successfully fused to produce extended divisions of labor and aesthetically or morally memorable artifacts under some circumstances
hut not others. A notable consequence of this systemic approach is
that it avoids the rigidly deterministic mold of many preceding
synthetic theories of civilization. "Challenges" must be perceived
as such, and "response" likewise allows bounded space for human
choice; and some deviation accordingly becomes possible in principle from the fixed unfolding of analytically specified phases of
growth and decline in civilizations. Toynbee thereby partly
exempts himself from the charge,justly levelled at Spengler, of
postulating an lIndemonstrated analogy between organic systems
and the cultur~t1 patterns of civilizations, and of effecting a logically unwarranted transfer of laws from the former to the latter.
:\1etaphorical thinking is prominent in Toybee's writing, to be
sure, but he deploys his theoretical metaphors with some caution.
A multi-volullle work of such scope presents critics with a broad
target. Critics haH' indeed found much to aim at. II Many have
matched Toynhee's conlident forays into the exotic past against
t heir own more specialized knowledge and have found his wanting in several respects. Others, disturbed by what they see to be
the arbitrary omissions, stretching, reversed sequences, and loose
analogies required to make historical data conform to Toynbee's
"laws," have gOlle on to question the ol~jective underlving his
search I()J" recurrent patterns of action. Some are qllite evidently
offended by TOYllhee's loftily prophetic tone, increasingly audible ill the later volumes, and have challenged his contention that
the West must tllrll to some vaguely delineated form ofecumenical religion it it IS to save itself from the fate of other civilizations.
A prime dirticlllty in all this controversy is that the terms of
\ictory and defeat elude definition. Toynbee's propositions remain trlle at the price of becoming circular. The severity of the
Appalachian mountain environment accounts f()r the relapse of
its mountaineers into "Celtic barbarism," whereas the Central
American rain 1()I'Csts pn)vided a stimlllating"Golden Mean" for
the growth of :\1ayan civilil.ation. 12 Hookworm and pervasive
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poverty establish the truth of the first proposition, the mute
testimony of Mayan temples in Copan and Tikal the second. We
know that the Swiss Alps offer a less taxing environment than
Appalachia, and the rain forests of Nicaragua a more severe
challenge than the Yucatan, because in the nineteenth century
the Swiss began building railroads and watches whereas
Nicaragua's Indians left nothing to attract the tourist. Similar
reasoning from effect to cause indicates why the pressures from
Steppe barbarians that the Chou dynasts found merely stimulating proved overwhelming and rigidifying farther west in Chinese
Turkestan. 13
This mode of circular ind uction is on fullest display in precisely
those passages in which one might have expected Toynbee to
avoid it most self-consciously. In a sub-section directly following
one entitled "How is a Challenge Proved Excessive?", Toynbee
ponders, by way of illustration, the differential fate of Scandinavian civilization in Norway, Iceland, and (~reenlalld.lj He begins
with the "indisputable" observation that "it was in Iceland and not
in Norway or in Sweden or in Denmark that the abortive Scandinavian Civili/ation achieved its greatest triumphs both in literature and in politics." But how is one to account filr that fact?
Toynbee notes "two conditions which are conspicuous: the
transmarine migration across arctic seas and the exchange of a
bleak and barren countryside in Norway for an Icelandic countryside which was bleaker and harrener." Norwav, it seems, was
(relatively speaking) too "soft" an environment t;) stimulate the
Viking genius to its fullest expression. I n Greenland, Oil the other
hand, a "Thule beyond Thule" where the countryside is "as much
bleaker and barrener tha n Iceland as Iceland itsel f is bleaker and
barrener than Norway," the environmental challenge, instead of
stimulating "a Scandinavian response with twice its Icelandic brilliance," proved so severe that "the Greenlanders made hardly any
contribution to Norse literature; they did not di~tinguish themselves in politics; and they betrayed a most un-Scandinavian-like
lack of drive in failing to li)llow up and clinch the great geographical discovery-the discovery of America-which was within their
grasp." The meaning of this "strange and melancholy story" is
(and here I must quote from Toynbee with some bemusement):
... that the challenge of Greenland was excessive, and that the reason
why the abortive Scandinavian Civili/.atiol1 actually attained its zenith
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neither in Greelliand nor in Norway but in Iceland was that in Iceland
the challenge to which the Scandinavian Civilization was the response
happened to he presented in the optimum degree of severity-a degree
which was a mean between t he lesser it nd the greater degree of severity in
which the same challenge was presented in Norway and in Greenland
re~pectively (p. ~93).

We know that the challenge of Iceland's environment was "optimal" for the Vikings because prose sagas and parliamentary
politics flourished in Iceland but not in Norway or in Greenland.
The circle is complete; we are back at Toynbee's initial observation. What is remarkable is only that the author, like Rabbit in a
(perhaps hazilv recollected) Winnie-the-Pooh story, does not appear to recognize where he has led his readers.15
Since the "bleak and barren countryside" in Norway might
appear a stern enough test of other peoples, if too yielding for the
Vikings, we are left to conclude that what constitutes an "optimal," "excessively severe," or "insufficiently severe" challenge is a
function of the inner nature of a people as evidenced by its
history. This unremarkable proposition is substantiated
throughout Toynbee's discussion of "challenge-and-response,"
of which it forll1s the theoretical core. Nowhere does he offer an
independent operational definition of these terms. He does,
however, acknowledge various anomalies that might seem to
threaten the empirical integrity of his schema. These can be
disposed of through such dei ex machina as the "law of compensation" that he invokes to explain why the Jews of the Diaspora were
subsequently able to "participate in the material prosperity which
has been built lip by the work of other men's hands in a country
which is not the immigrants' home," and why London and Paris
were "rewarded doubly" fe)!" riverine sites that made them attractive to Viking raiders. tS In his theoretical discussion of his key
terms, Toynbee further considers those challenges that have
proved too severe for one people, yet an optimal stimulus for
another--e.g., the temperate forest of northwestern Europe that
so "effectually baffled Primitive Man, unequipped ... with implements f()r felling the f()T·est trees, and ignorant of how to turn
the rich underlying soil to account by cultivation," as to drive him
"poleward" to the "frozen Tundra"; or the oil-fields in the Azerbaijani wastelands which "challenged one human society after
another to master them for human ends before the challenge
[was] eventually answered."17 Here explanation merges so inti-
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mately with description of what did in LlCt happen as to become
inextricahly entwined.
Toynbee employs similar methods to acocunt for the breakdown and disintegration of civilizations. But at this point it may be
mroe profitable to note a further theoretical curiosity in Toynbee's schema. A Study oj History is a study of civilizations~their
emergence, their efflorescence, their breakdown. their ultimate
disintegration. Toynbee devotes much care to identifying, distinguishing, relating, and classifying the nineteen or more civilizations that he proposes subsequently to disclIss!K Yet it is one of
the more remarkable facts about his treatise that nowhere in the
twelve volumes does one encounter either a denotative or an
operational definition of the unit to which all his propositions
purportedly apply. Insofar as one can infer what Toynbee means
by a "civilization" from his use of the term, it would seem to refer
to societies in which a spatially extensive division of labor' has been
given a unifying symbolic expression through an aesthetically
distinctive and morally complex religious code. But this definition does not serve very well to identify what most scholars would
consider the most important features of "Sinic" civilization, nor
does it adeq uately explain Toynbee's classificatiol\ of "Yucatec,"
"Mexic," and "Mayan" civili/ations as separate entities.
What the absence of an explicit definition of "civilization" does
do, however, is to give Toynbee very considerable theoretical
latitude for adjusting his propositions to the data of history. For
this purpose it serves admirably. Because Toynbee sometimes
implicitly equates distinctive religious orientatiolls wit h civilizations, he portrays the supersession of "Sinic" civilization by a
(Mahayana Buddhist) "Far Eastern" civilization embracing the
Yellow and Yangtze River basins of Sinic civilization, the southeast coast of China, Korea, Japan, and~with less certainty~the
Chinese interior. On other occasions, however, he finds it convenient to recognize that Japan evolved very largely as an isolated
insular kingdom that borrowed selectively from China in the sixth
and seventh centuries but blended these borrowings with its own
distinctive cultural patterns in a feudal setting radically different
from that of the imperial Chinese state. 19 Toynbee discerns an
"Iranic" and an "Arabic" civilization "beneath the surface of the
tardily and forcibly unified Islamic Society,"20 but he puzzles
many Islamicists by withholding a similar designation from the
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"abortive" Ottoman civilization on the ground that it proved
insufficienth creative in developing and extending Islamic theology. The puzzle is at least partly resolved, however, when one
considers the awkwardness of being otherwise obliged to fit the
"premature" emergence of an Ottoman "universal state" into
Tovnbee's schema. Similarly, the boundary line between "Orthodox Christiniaty" and "the West" appears to expand and contract with the theoretical exigencies of establishing a rhythm of
three and a half "beats" in the "breakdown" of civilizations. And
Toynbec, in his eagerness to find cases to demonstrate the pervasive role of"challenge" and "response" in history, draws as freely
on sub-divisions within civilizations (e.g., "Dixie-MassachusettsMaine") as Oil whole civilizations to prove his point. 21 Such flexibility may add to the apparent plausibility of his porpositions. It
does persistently raise the qucstion, in the later volumes, ofwhat is
emerging or breaking down.
'
This is indeed a crucial question; and it is a questioll, as I have
indicated, that Toynbee does not squarely address. He does not
address it, olle may conjecture, because of his assumptionimplicit throughout every volumc-that all the definitive
achievemenh ofa civili/ation occur synergistically (and thereftne
more or les~ simultaneously), wit h t he very important but ambiguous exception of "uTli\ersaJ" religions. There is a certain
surface plamibility to this assumption. Athenian democracy
seemed nevel more vital than during the construction of the
Parthenon; Julius Caesar's Rome was also Virgil's: Shakespeare
and Sir Francis Drake both added luster to the reign of "Good
Queen Kess"; China's horders reached their outermost extent in
t he Tang and Qing dynasties during the Golden Ages of pottery,
poetrv, and painting. But these cases are selectively cited.
Machiavelli cold write ill despair about the unmitigated corruption of Florelltine politics in a period in which the Florentine
School of paillt ing was reaching its greatest glory. Homer's voice
is a lonely one from t he "Dark Ages" of Greece; Leibniz independently invented t he calculus in a Germany prostrated by the
Thirty Years War. And 1he dimensions of human achievement so
correlated are often selectively weighted as well. Spectacular surviving art i I'aCt'i count j()r more than those that lie in ruins; aesthetic achievement ranks above practical accomplishment. Two or
three brilliant painters endow their contemporaries with a halo
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effect and distract attention from a paucity of poets and physicians. Elite culture matters more than general well-being. By what
criteria do wejudge the Aeneid a greater accomplishment than the
invention ofthe steam engine? What calculus enables us to distinguish a "Golden Age" of supreme achievement ill three or four
creative activities and none in others from a "Silver Age" of high
but not quite imperishable attainment in all known fields of
human endeavor? What are we to make of evidence that public
and private sanitation deteriorated sharply during the European
"Renaissance"?
Toynbee is too good an historian to remain oblivious to these
anomalies. His solution is characteristic of his approach. In identifying his nineteen civilizations, he appeals to an intuitive sense
that civilizations f()rm culturally distinctive and indivisible entities, sometimes citing great architectural monuments, sometimes philosophical tracts, sometimes political institutions to support his case. Since, in this undertaking, he remains unCC)!1strained by any explicit criteria for demarcating his units, he is
free to highlight whichever features suit his case in establishing
that a civilization as a whole has reached one of the phases that his
theory requires. It is quite true that Toynbee includes in his study
certain subsections devoted to elaborations of "criteria" for
"growth," "breakdown," and "disintegration."22 But inspection
reveals that these criteria, often well-stated as abst ract formulations, quickly become ad hoc illustrations of the process itself.
liere the instances of human achievement that fall outside the
initial cluster can be selectively passed over or turned to advantage to establish the desired periodicity of "breakdown" and "revival." Contexts dissolve, explanations and illustrations intermingle, and disconfirming data are swept away in a cascade of
religious metaphor. The possibility of keeping one's eye on the
conformity of anyone unit of civilization to Toynbee's "laws"
largely disappears in this turbulent f1oocl. Not only Toynbee's
magisterial style is implicated in the celebrated "relentless inevitability" of his vision of history. This quality derives even more
from his methods themselves.
A sense of inevitability is, of course, very much in accordance
with Toynbee's explicit script. The frailty of humanity, the hubris
to which it is subject in its golden moments, the irresistible
rhythms of breakdown and disintegration form the Graeco-
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Christian weft across which-especially in his later volumes-he
weaves his tapestry of history. But there is yet another sense in
which his approach pre-determines his destination. Toynbee's
theoretical post ure is that of a disinterested observer who records
the emergence of large-scale concentrations of human energy
amid undifferentiated small-scale societies; the cresting of this
energy in the form of great historic civilizations; and its inexorable subsidence and absorption into an entropic slough. It is very
much to his purpose to note the conditions under which such
events occur, to label and compare the stages through which
civilizations pass, and to draw conclusions concerning the probable fate awaiting our own. What is missing in his pages is any
theoretical post ulate concerning the motives of the participants in
these ventures. Stages unfold; laws are fulfilled; civilizations
metaphorically effloresce, bloom, and die. But these collective
properties and dynamics of civilizations do not result from the
intentions of individual actors, or even from the unintended
consequences of their interactions. The laws civilizations follow
are "higher" laws-laws revealed by the passage of time, independent of human wish and human design, dissociated from
individual behavior and therefore not open to reversal at that
level. Toynbee's conclusion follows: we must seek grace, trusting
in a Providence we cannot propitiate.
There is an awesome majesty and mystery in this vision. But
there are theoretical costs to it as well. Toynbee's treatise contains
no sustained and consistent model of how human beings learn
from experience. The lack of these feedback loops renders indeterminate why some societies respond more effectively than
others to challenges. Clearly, some do; and Toynbee can only
treat these "correct" responses as happy accidents, manifestations
of the "temper" of a people-in essence, as unpredictable and
therefore inex plicable. That is not a very satisfactory resolution of
an important theoretical issue. The same problem arises in relation to the "breakdown" of civilizations. As soon as one grants that
individuals are differentially motivated to persist in collectively
self-destructive behavior, and that differeing structural arrangements will reinforce or retard such behavior, the theoretically specified expectation that all civilizations will undergo a
degenerative process of comparable periodicity becomes puzzling. It may be that over several hundred years the degree of
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complex interdependence and the probability of strategic structural rigidities in the face of changing environments is such that
by some law of averages all civilizations are doomed to
disintegration-but that is a very different argument from the
one Toynbee advances.
A Stndy of History is a magnificent failure. It. displays an historical panorama of unrivalled grandeur; it offers a challenging
perspective on macro-history; it generates profoundly compelling and analytical problems; it advances a series of stimulating
hypotheses concerning its subject matter; it employs juxtaposiitons and makes connections that are frequently breathtaking ir:: effect. Despite serious questions about its ELCtual arrangements and its interpretations, it maintains an intimate tie between
theoretical approach and data; and the scholarly erudition it
evidences is almost beyond belief. But it is a failure all the same
because-paradoxically-it cannot fail. Its numerous protective
devices assure, in a larger sense, its irrefutahility. And a theory
that is conceptually protected in principle from refutation cannot
properly count as an explanation of those relationships it is the
distinctive task of the theory to explain.2:1
Micro-ExjJZanation: The Retreat to Induction

Toynbee's Elilures matter because A Study oflhltory matters. III
its scope and depth, as in its length and density of argument, it
seems to stand at some probable outer limit of human achievement. Toynbee stumbled into some of the same pitfalls as his
predecessors, hut he did so by a very much more circuitous and
sophisticated route. Since, in the judgment of mo~t critics, he did
in the end so stumble, his mishap has been taken as indicative of
problems in herent in the enterprise of theoretical macro-historv
itself.
Contemporary historians have been quick to carry these observations to their logical conclusion. They now tend scrupulously to
dwell on the complexity of relationships revealed by empirical
microanalysis. Explicitly or implicitly influenced by the methods
of Sir Lewis Namier, they have acquired a professionally-induced
resistance to simplifying labels, and more readily accord their
trust to those who document the social reality such labels
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ohscure. 24 Con fronted by a far more awesome array of historical
mOrlogra phs (han the great synthesizers of the past, serious scholars today are inclined to sense a more sustained tension between
the pursuit of truth and the search for recurrent patterns. Multivariant explanations along multiple dimensions-the more the
better-sign i fv mastery of the subject matter. The contem plation
of history no longer yields vistas of "progress," or of cumulative
dialectical opposition, or even of predictable cycles. Historians
speak lllore readily of miscarried intentions, of the insufficient
selt~consciousness of every era (including their own), of the
tragedy--or hettel', the "irony"--of their subject. 25
Schematic treatments of human history now almost autolllatically excite critical suspicion. Because of its symbolic relationship
to current political conf1icts, Marxist historical analysis forma a
case in itself; neither its proponents nor their critics can remain
oblivious to the social relevance of their conclusions. More instructive is the fate of other less politically engaged efforts to
achieve a macro-historic synthesis. Toynbee's we have already
examined. But what of the others? Some of these works-if not
(hose of Vico, then those of Hegel, Buckle, Spencer, and
Spengler-attained a certain popular acclaim; and professional
historians accordingly felt called upon to point out the factual
omissions and distortions, the arbitrary stretching and contraction of crucial categories, required to give plausibility to their
bolder generalizations. Today the victory of the critics is complete. Not only are the objects of their criticism effectively discredited; they are very seldom read. 26
Yet this victory has had its price. It has obscured the costs of
eschewing the search for larger patterns in history. Civilizations
break down for many reasons. It does not follow that each case of
disintegration is unique in the sense thatarl hoc explanations must
be devised afresh in each case to account for the breakdown.
Radical nominalism may be an understandable-even an
appropriate-response to the gross categorizations and
mechanistic generalizations of a Spencer or a Spengler. But an
unqualified rejection of their methods and objectives can constitute a metaphysical dogmatism of its own. Pushed to an extreme,
dogmatic nominalism amounts to the contention that organizing
discrete historical phenomena into categories and patterns per-
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mitting cross-civilizational comparison is intrinsically invalid. It
implies that explanations are logically conceivable in forms other
t han as specific applications of general propositions. Most strikingly, it appears to deny the desirability-let alone the necessity--of economy in thought.
Universalizing the methodological program of dose-grained
empirical studies seems to dojust that. The virtue of revealing the
full complexity of human interaction underlying grosser substantive categories has become so evident as to invite t he inappropriate corollary that micro-analysis is inherently superior to macroanalysis. There are many difficulties to maintaining this position.
One is that it provides no check against its reduction to absurdity:
if villages are more "real" than civilizations, then why not concentrate on kinship networks, the nuclear family, the individual, and
so on into infinite regress? The obvious answer-that community
social systems may have emergent "global" properties not observable in the isolated individual-applies analogously to the costs of
reducing civilizations to the villages they contain. Choice of unit
for analysis is one of convenience, not of truth. The proper issue
is what is gained-and what is given up-by shifting one's focus
among levels of societal organization.
But do civilizations have discernible boundaries in the same
sense as villages? Clearly they do not. Villages aIT typically surrounded by fields; one generally knows when olle has crossed a
boundary between them, but in any case one cannot be simultaneously present in two villages. Civilizations arc more ambiguous entities. In common usage they have (or had) geographical
extent and determinate membership. But civilizations are probably more usefuly thought of as states of mind-distinctive patterns of orientation-and, as such, they can be said to overlap,
coalesce, fade out, or become transmitted across deserts and
oceans and over generations. It is not at all sel f-evident that all
elements ofa civilization must hang together, or c\'cn what constitute the necessary and sufficient elements for defining a civilization; and thus, without impropriety, one may speak of a concrete
individual's being a product of-or "embodying"-two or more
civilizations. These ambiguous qualities of ci\ilizations assure
am pIe room for dispute over the characteristics, reach, degree of
uniformity, duration, demarcation, and bases for sub-divisions in
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discussions of "a" civilization. They also undeniably complicate
the problems of speaking coherently and operationally about the
"breakdown" or "distintegration" of a civilization.
Since all these points regarding "civilizations" are crucial to a
later argument, I do not wish to pursue them here. Rather, I wish
to note the impasse to which they lead. For it is precisely such
considerations that have given rise to the search for levels of social
reality that can satisfy the most stringently nominalist criteria. But
if, as I have argued, the methodological canons accompanying the
reduction of macro- to micro-units constitute not so much a
solution as a strategic retreat, the direction of the advance itself
becomes ambiguous. The losses in either case remain as salient as
the gains.
One obvious move is simply to side-step the methodological
issue altogether. A particularly distinguished instance of this
maneuver is William McNeill's The Rise oj the West. 27 As his subtitle ("A History of the Human Community") more accurately
indicates, McNeill aspires to nothing less than presentation of
global history on a grand scale. He has proved remarkably successful in this ambitious venture. Not even the most exotic outposts of humallity-New Guinea, Greenland, Easter Island, the
upper Amazon Valley--escape his synoptic scrutiny; and McNeill
explicitly justifies the limited space he devotes to these regions.
The scope of his history is not idle show; for it is one of McNeill's
great contributions to generate important new analytical questions through synchronically charting the differential
emergence, development, and eventual contact of scattered centers of human activity. At the same time, McNeill quite dearly
wishes to avoid the controversies that have brought more
schematized treatments of world history into disrepute. He distinguishes the cultural aggregates he calls "civilizations" from
smaller-scale, less complex societies; he is very much interested in
the diffusion alld interleaving of distinctive cultural forms, and
he has mallY plausible and perceptive suggestions to offer regarding the principal sources of the vitality, dominance, and fossilization of the dill'erent cultures. But he is careful not to claim an
organic unity filr the civilizations he studies, and he puts forward
no dubious organic analogy to explain their rise and decay.
McNeill's work-to judge from the eff10rescence of "world"
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histories over the past two decades-has evidently restored tlIe
respectability of macro-history in the eyes of many historians,2H
Its influence, however, rests at least in part on McNeill's decision
to forego any attempt at explicit ~eneral theorizing, His treatise is
studded, to be sure, with striking comparative observations,
McNeill is also at some pains to show the systemic pressures that
alter the equilibria of dominance among organized foci of human
action. Yet the comparisons emerge as f1ashes of imaginative
connection, not as requisite references entailed by his approach;
and the systemic adjustments among civilizations, too, are highlighted or passed over in accordance with the aut hor's sense of
their thematic significance. His explanations are those of a
learned historian sensitively attuned to the distinctive dynamics
of each of the many societies he discusses. What McNeill has
accomplished, then, is an imposing compression of human history into a self-consciously selective and sophisticated narrative in
which he effectively exploits the multidimensional comparative
possibilities of a global perspective. It is a splendid accomplishment; but it is the triumph of an author, not of a method.
The very quality that commends McNeill's work to normally
skeptical professional historians forms also its principal limit ation. 29 The Rise of the West is an awesomely eclectic book. McNeill
acquires his authority cumulatively through closely argued
passages--Dftenlong footnotes, in which he shows himself master
of an astonishing array of diversified information. I hs approach
obli~es him to build his intimately contextual hypotheses concerning the fate of civilizations and proto-civilizations out of a knowledge of the different smelting properties of iron and copper (p.
132, ft. 2), the meteorological characteristics of the South Pacific
(pp. 262-264), the subtleties of Bactrian art forms (Plates 70-73),
and the importance of alfalfa to Parthian cavalry techniques (p.
352). Civilizations, he implies, are such complex entities that one
msut keep an open eye and an open mind to the possibility that, in
any given case, the most disparate, varie~ated, and obscure variables may actually, through a chain of complex connections,
critically destabilize the equilibrium defining its boundary relations with other civilizations or sustaining its dist inguishing institutions. The networks of orientations and relationships we
deem civilizations are so intricately compounded olsuch variables
that no lesser approach will do.
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Mc;'\leill may well he right; but ifso, then the task of accounting
Ii)!' the disintegration of civilizations is ultimately hopeless. Hi~
imposing achievement obscures, but does not invalidate, this
rather bleak proposition. Not only does the methodological corollary of his (and other empiricist historians') approach imply the
need for exceptional erudition to master the constellation of
variables pertinent to each of a series of historical cases. I t does
not even suggest a point of departure I()r further inquiry.
Problems of hoth kinds beset the inductive models cllrrently
favored. Most obviously, Illuch crucial data regarding the more
ancient civilizations remains incomplete and unreliable. In mallY
instances, it may well prove irretrievable in any more trustworthy
/i)rm. Analysts ill search of patterns must therefore confront the
temptation to endow groups lin which data is not available with
t he statist ical properties of individ uals on which it is. But a greater
difficulty arises in refining and integrating the immense collage
of information "bout past civilizations that has already been lll1earthed. Bv any definition, whole civilizations are units of extraordinary cOlllplexity. To reconstruct their essential properties
and critical relationships in the absence of theoretically established crittTia of factual relevance requires s panoptic grasp of
detail and entails much uncontrolled selectiOl~. The historian of
whole civilizations must match climatological and topographical
features with trade patterns and techniques of warfare, demographic estimates with personal narratives, religious ideals with
daily practice, global developments with what could have been
understood of t hem by members of particular civilizations indifferent historical eras. This task is made immeasurably more complicated hy the numerous len'ls of physical and social organization from which the findings are drawn and the multiplicity of
disciplinary perspectives f'rom which they are assessed. One
cannot simply aggregate sllch elements into a comprehensive
pattern. Any pretense to theoretical connectedness must be sacrificd in the attcmpt.:lO
In the work of a skillful analyst like McNeill, these disparate
varia hies and propositions can be fit together with at least IittTan
(if not fully scientific) persuasivencss. But a further question
remains: is the purported explanation true? That question is Itot
so easily answered. Even if the total package of explanatory propositions accounts for the data in question, it is still not clear which
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elements were necessary and sufficient to that desired end. All
could be essential; some could be so, but trivially and dispensably
so; some could be false, but outweighed hy others that are true.
The same considerations apply if the explanation is subsequently
falsified. And in either case, it remains unclear which elements
should be preserved or rejected in forming an explanation for
analogous events in other settings. The temptation therefore
grows to pack as many plausible propositions as possible into an
explanation since at least some are probably true. In short, this
approach leaves readers to deal, not with theories that deserve
increasing confidence because of their ability to withstand
cumlIlative testing, but with analysts who obtain that confidence
through their argumentative skills, their demollstrable knowledgeability, and their success in appealing to the reader's own
sense of probabilities. The route they fc)lIow is Olle t hat has borne
much traffic; but for all that, it is none the more likely to lead in
the end to an accurate and economical identificat ion of t he critical
systemic determinants of the fate of civiIizatiom.

Criteria for

(J

(;enem{ Theory oj Cil!iliwtioll

The preceding survey points to four somewhat paradoxical
conclusions. Civilizations as objects of conceptual representation
are highly complex and variegated entities. The causes of their
disintegration are accordingly almost surely multiple. Precisely
because civilizations are so complex, however, and because the
causes of their disintegration are so various, historians have acted
prematurely in abandoning the quest for general macrohistorical theories that can potentially simplify and order the
objects and processes to be explained. But filially, this quest
cannot properly be pursued through employing nOl1operational
concepts yielding tautological truths.
These conclusions carry certain met hodolo~ical coroll,u-ies.
Together the corollaries establish criteria that any macrohistorical theory must meet if it is to hold much promise. These
criteria are both negative and positive.
Negatively, these criteria require:
I. That the theory /J1"(J1!ide tlieoretimlly .'/lcn/ieri bOl1l1riaril'.1 to what is to
be explained. If a civilization is thought of as the total set of distinctive metaphysical, religious, aesthetic, technological, political, and
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interactive patterns of orientation within a large-scale society,
then providing an explanation for changes within that set is
probably beyond the reach of any general theory except at the
price of arbitrary selectivity. The effective thrust of this criterion
is to raise questions about the feasibility of developing systematically interconnected propositions applying to any unit conceived
in these terms.
2. That the thl'Ory avoid t)()stulatin[; a systemic unityfor which there is
no evidence amon[; thf variables dfjinin[; civilizations and then making
that unity a prfdicatf olfnrther analysis. To treat civilizations as basic
objects for analysis presupposes that the complexes of patterns
that differentiate them can validly be grouped within mutually
exclusive boundaries. It further requires the analyst to show that
the various elements within a complex so segregated will respond
sensitively to a change in anyone component pattern. Until it
establishes that civilizations have determinate boundaries and
internal systemic coherence, any theory that treats civilizations as
social units rather than as labels of convenience remains suspect.
I n particular. writers such as Spengler and Toynbee build a
misleading premise into their analyses in their unsubstantiated
prediction that a civilization as a whole can be said to "rise" or
"faIl."
3. That tlif tlil'Ory Ifaw ,ljJa('f/or both arcident and dfsi[;n,jor both
natural catrLltrophf and human error, in accountin[;/or theji,rces contributin[; to thf riisinte[;ration oj civilizations. A theory that is obliged
to deny such f()rces denies empirically ascertainable reality. But
since no theory can encompass all such stresses on civilizations
except through tautology or radical rejection of the criter;on of
explanatory economy, the search for comprehensive explanations in this area appears misplaced. A general theory of disintegration can only be contingent; it cannot be expected to do more
than indicate systemic tensions and strategic vulnerabilities that
will become catabolic when triggered by exogenous forces.
4. That thf thfory eschew detrrministic analogies, organic or mechanical, that imply inl'vitablf sta[;fS thr01.l[;h which all civilizations must pass.
Such analogies are the source of misplaced efforts to force the
historical data of civilizations into periodicities in order to establish a symmetry of processes and outcomes. Since the necessity for
the "laws" to which civilizations are held to be subject is itself
typically unexplained, these efforts are usually gratuitous.
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To hold promise, a macro-historical theory of civilizations
should have at least two further properties:
S.ft should establish connections between ,Iystemic outcomes (e.g., the
"breakdown" of a civilization) and individual action in terml' that
make the latter the primary endogenous source oj explanations for the
former. Insofar as the outcome is not attributable to exogenous
forces (e.g., seismic sea waves) that by definition fall outside the
predictive range of the theory, it should be predictable-and
therefore explicable-as the consequence of actions undertaken
by human beings with systematically attributable motives. To
make this connection, one need not argue the implausible-that
the fate of civilizations directly reHects the intentions of their
members. It is enough to show that the logic of the situation
confronting individual actors is stich that the aggregate effect of
their predictable behavior will correspond (in the absence of
significant exogenous forces) to that fate.
6. As a necessary condition for meeting the preceding requirement, the theory should contain only such variables as can be
systematically related to one another. In a sense, this condition is
merely an element of any definition of a theory. An explanation
that fuses meteorological conditions, military technology, profit
motives, and the will of God into a non-additive ag).{regate may in
fact provide a quite realistic account of why a particular civilization disintegrated. It cannot be said, on the other hand, to have
any of the qualities that make theories useful devices for simplification, generalization, and contingent prediction.
Taken together, these six criteria all point to the same conclusion. A macro-historical theory that can meet them is not likely to
be of service in explaining fully and directly the disintegration of
total civilizations. Civilizations are likely to remain beyond the
direct reach of such theories because civilizations as objects of
conceptual representation are simply too ill-defined, too
heterogeneous, too complex. There is no reason to suppose they
can accurately be represented as integrated systems, and none for
thinking that they follow laws deriving from the predictable consequences of the interaction of individuals with systematically
ascribable motives. Accordingly, the pursuit of general theories to
account for their breakdown in these terms is probably a futile
endeavor.
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A very simple shift of f(xus may suffice to point a way out of this
impasse. Civilizations as such are probably not amenable to incorporation in a gelleral theory of societal catabolism; but the political regimes that form their civic core quite possibly may be subject
to such laws. It is the central argument of this essay that an
attempt of this Ilature at general theory holds promise, and that
by identifying certain crucial elements in the disintegration of the
great historic hureaucratic empires one may contribute in a
theoretically manageable way to an explanation of the disintegration of the civilizations in which they were embedded.
Two questions must be addressed to make this contention
plausible. If one switches the focus from civilizations to empires,
the shift of focus implies some reason for thinking that a general
theory of the disintegration of such regimes can meet the six
criteria of the preceding section more effectively than a theory
that directly addresses the fall of civilizations. One should therefore be expected to indicate why a political theory of imperial
regimes might have greater success in fulfilling these criteria. It
will then still be necessary to consider the metaphorical assertion
that the historic bureaucratic empires formed the "core" of their
civilizations.
By definition, a political system forms a single analytic plane on
which to order the variables to be explained by a general theory.
One may think of a political system as a theoretical construct
corresponding to those aspects of human action directed toward
acquiring, managing, or inf1uencing the management of the
power to make decisions that collectively and effectively bind the
members of a total society or its subdivisions. Analytically
abstracting these aspects from the totality of human activity assures in principle that one can systematically coordinate propositions concerning political action without category error in a manner demarcating endogenous political variables from the
exogenous variables of the residual realm of human action and of
the natural world.
Shifting one's theoretical focus to sets of political interactions
that can be represented by conceptual systems has the very important additional advantage of taking behavioral systems with rela-
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tively determinate boundaries as the units for analysis. The
boundaries among these units are demarcated by jurisdictional
proclamations and agreements that specify who is bound---or
whom political leaders are attempting to bind-through purportedly collective decisions. But what canjustify the internal conceptual unity im plied by the term political system? The justification
derives directly from the logic of the situation implicit in the
conceptualization of politics as the attempt to acquire or manage
the power to make collectively binding decisions \vith reference to
a total social unit. The struggle to acquire or exercise sovereign
power in this sense necessarily implicates all those who seek it or
who are bound by the outcome. It obliges all political actors to
remam attentive to effective challenges to the defining rationale
for political states-namely, the claim to a monopoly over the
legitimate use of force as a predicate of the sovereign power to
make collectively binding decisions. Breaches of this monopoly
may occur routinely in feudal systems, during expanding guerrilla or civil wars, in instances of neo-colonialism, or in those
settings in which the "national" government's writ scarcely runs
beyond the capital city or proves ineffectual in confrontations
with corporate groups. But given the logic of political action, such
disarticulation of the power to make binding decisions for a
jurisdictionally defined unit remains inescapably consequential
for all political participants, who, if they do not simply evade
attempts to make such decisions effectively binding, must enter
into relationship ranging from negotiation to open warfare. Even
under conditions of political disarticulation, theil, their interactions may be said to form a system.
The systemic implications of the struggle to assert or disarticulate political sovereignty permit one to give operational meaning
to the concepts of "breakdown" and "distintegration." The
"breakdown" of a political system may be said to occur when the
participants in a formally integrated polity begin to predicate
their actions upon perceptions of the government's generalized
incapacity to manipulate politically strategic variables in accordance with its goals. 3 ! "Disintegration," which Toynbee distinguishes from "breakdown," may be thought of as a limiting condition in which this incapacity has become so manifest that a government's efforts to assert its authority simply cease to form
consequential premises in the decisions of other actors within the
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former system. When this degree of political entropy has been
reached, the very concept of a "system" as an interrelated set of
variables theoretically differentiated from an "environment"
cease~ to have an empirical referent.
To focus on the implications of sovereignty for the ordering of
political action is not, however, to proclaim the sovereignty of
politics as a causal force in society. In demarcating endogenous
and exogenous forces, the concept ofa political system in no sense
denies the potential significance of an irruption into the political
arena of such exogenous forces and a volcanic explosion, religious chiliasm, or an invader profiting from a sudden shift in the
balance of military technologies. What it does do-all it can do-is
to specify the clements that will be implicated in mediating these
forces within the system and how such elements will interact.
Disease is not an endogenous political phenomenon; but how the
collective f()rccs of a society are deployed in response to an
epidemic quite clearly is. No general theory of political systems
could anticipate the coming of a Pizarro to Peru; but such a theory
could be expected to reveal the structural vulnerabilities of the
exceptionally centralized Andean Em pire that led to its swift
disintegration following Pizarro's capture ofthe Great Inca. Like
any other scientific theory, a theory of political systems is quite
properly contingent: it specifies a determinate relationship
among its variables, but it does not predict that the fate of any
particular political order will unfold in a predestined sequence.
Whether and when an actual political system disintegrates is left,
within the thcory, to the mutable play of natural forces and
human choice.
But if an analysis of political systems offers advantages not
open to those who seek to construct similar theories to account for
the basic processes of civilizations, the question remains of how to
connect the bte of the empirical political systems of the past to the
civilizations in which they were embedded. To justify this somewhat synecdochic undertaking, it will be helpful to consider various possible relationships between historical political systems and
the more diffuse and broadly encompassing patterns of orientation we call civilizations before considering the validity of taking a
political part for a cultural whole.
Four broad patterns emerge from an inspection of past civilizations. In some cases, a single identifiable civilization embraced
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numerous sovereign political entities. The Greek city states,
though leagued in defense of a common culture against the
Persians, had quite obviously reverted to acting as independent
sovereign entities by the time of the Pcloponnesian Wars. The
medieval caliphates of Baghdad and Cbrdoba stood at opposite
ends of a self-consciously and aspirantly unitary :\1uslim civilizatiorl. Conversely, certain empires-most conspicuously, the
Achaemenid, Roman, and Mughal-included elements of more
than one distinct civilization within their jurisdictional borders.
Among those instances in which a single bureaucratic empire was
more or less coterminous with the effective geographical extent
of a civilization, two further possibilities can be found. In some
cases, an alternative social institution (typically, a church or cadre
ofliterati) so powerfully knit a common cultural system together
as to preserve the unity of a civilization throughout fluctuations in
the fortunes ofthe corresponding political order. The collapse of
the Maurya and Gupta empires did not fundamentally disrupt
the continuity of Hindu civilization at a time when it was still
largely limited to the Indian "sub-continent," since this civilization had always been firmly anchored in the caste system in any
case. The Western Christian and Chinese civilizations likewise
survived the disruption of the spatially coterminous Carolingian
and Chinese dynastic empires. In contrast, the fate of the Persian,
Egyptian, Aztec, and Andean civilizations shows that at some
point the survival of a civilization may become inextricably dependent on the survival of the corresponding political regime.
The destruction of the Achaemenid, Sassanid, Aztec, and Andean empires was so complete, and so intimately associated with
the continued coherence of the civilizations they defended, as to
raise few issues concerning the concept of continuity in either
sphere. Other cases are more problematic. About the only point
on which historians of Rome are now in full agreement is that the
selection of 476 A.D. as the date of the "[ill" of the Western
Empire is at best one of convenience. Byzantine civilization was
more definitively brought to a close in its original heartland with
the conquest of Constantinople and its conversion into Istanbul
by Sultan Mehmed II in 1453, but by that time Russian Orthodox
patriarchs had already made clear their intentioll to establish a
"Third Rome" in Moscow. To speak of the Egyptian and Chinese
"empires" is to obscure the fact that often onlv geographical
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isolation concealed the degree of political entropy in these regions during the "times of troubles" between dynasties. In the
Chinese case, a dynastic name-as in the decision to refer to the
period 618-907 A.D. as the period of "Tang" China despite the
devastating disruption wrought by the An Lu-Shan and Huang
Chao rebellions of 715 and 874 respectively-has had much the
same effect.
Regardless of the historical patterns of congruence and the
conceptual problems of defining continuity, it can be argued that
the great bureaucratic empires of the past were so strategically
embedded within their encompassing civilizations as to constitute
the single most important matrices of the determinants that
shaped the latters' fate. As instances of the simultaneous destruction of an empire and a coterminous civilization make obvious,
the political system must frequently be depended upon to
mobilize and deploy the military force necessary to fend off
invaders bent lIot only on seizing territory but on extirpating the
distinctive cultural practices associated with that territory. State
assurance of some minimal level of internal security is even more
evidently an indispensable condition for the emergence of any
civilization at all, as Thomas Hobbes quite unforgettably contended.32 But effective and broadly extensive political systems are
also well placed in a positive sense to generate or to extract the
"surplus" societal resources required to create and sustainwhether directly, as in the construction of the pyramids, or
through infra-structural support of universities, churches,
academies, and communication systems-the artifacts and symbols by which a civilization becomes defined. While the examples
of Hellenic philosophy, Dutch painting, and church-building in
feudal France are a reminder that organized state support is
neither a sufficient nor even a directly necessary condition for the
creation of a high culture, for much of the world the definitive
culture of a civilization has been the culture of a court. In some
societies-Balinese, Javanese, and Cambodian are said to be
instances-the function of the political order is held to have been
precisely that of providing a material exemplification of cultural
ideals.:l :!
One could readily adduce further examples-including the
characteristic exchange relationships through which emperors
have sought and have generally obtained clerical sanction to claim
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divine ordination for their rule-to elaborate the decisive connection between the political and cultural orders of past civilizations.
As this last instance suggests, these connections were so widely
recognized at the time as to have become institutionalized in many
civilizations. It may theref(Jre be more useful to emphasize what
these rituals portend. Political symbols and ceremonies have been
everywhere so orgnaized as to emphasize the collective nature of
the decisions taken by those who occupy authoritative positions
within the hierarchies created by a political division of labor.
However plural the nature of the social communities held formally accountable to these decisions, it remains very much to the
intere~t (though not always to the perceived interest) ofthose who
occupy the top positions within political hierarchies to economize
on the use of force by identifying themselves with the unifying
symbols of the most comprehensive cultural unit corresponding
to their jurisdiction. Rulers have a powerful incentive to fuse the
cultural and political identities of those whom they cannot afford
to segregate or dominate; and when a significant spatial correspondence exists between total civilizations and political empires,
the logic of this strategy implies that those who rule the latter will
seek to intertwine the two in a common destiny.
In the heady days of decolonization, the Ghanaian leader
Kwame Nkrumah declared in self-consciously Jacobean cadences, "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else will
follow." The subsequent history of Ghana-indeed, of all
Africa-has shown his advice to be overly simple in its application
to developmental politics. As a guide to the study of civilizations,
however, his proposition has much to recommend it. To focus on
the political dynamics of the historical empires is, in large measure, to focus also on the implicated cluster of variables whch in
their interaction have repeatedly tied the prospects for civilizations to the fate of their embedded political systems.
L'nil'nsity oj Crili/urnia, Santa Cruz
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